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The Welfare Effects of Slum Improvement Programs: The Case of Mumbai 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Slums, which are characterized by substandard housing and inadequate water and 
sanitation facilities, are among the most pressing urban environmental problems in 
developing countries.  Policies to improve the welfare of slum dwellers include 
upgrading slum housing in situ—for example, by providing piped water and sewage 
connections—and relocating slum dwellers to better quality, low cost housing.   
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the welfare effects of such programs using 
data for Mumbai (Bombay), India.  A key issue in slum upgrading is whether current 
residents are made better off by improving housing in situ, or by relocating.  The answer 
to this question depends on the tradeoffs people are willing to make between commuting 
costs, housing costs and the attributes of the housing that they consume.  If, for example, 
a relocation program distances a worker from his job and, if finding a new job is difficult, 
in situ improvements in housing may dominate relocation programs.  The utility of 
relocation programs also depends on neighborhood composition:  if households depend 
on neighbors of the same caste or ethnic group for information about employment or for 
social services, relocation to neighborhoods of different ethnicity may be welfare-
reducing.  
Evaluating the welfare effects of slum upgrading and resettlement programs 
requires estimating models of residential location choice, in which households trade off 
commuting costs against the cost and attributes of the housing they consume, including 
neighborhood attributes.  We accomplish this using data for 5,000 households in Mumbai, 
a city in which 40% of the population lives in slums.  A key feature of Mumbai that 
distinguishes it from other Third World cities is that many slums are centrally located, i.e., 
located near employment centers, rather than being relegated to the periphery of the city.  
Slum relocation projects may therefore involve moving people to more remote locations.  
We ask what corresponding improvements in housing and/or income would be necessary 
to offset the location change. 
To answer these questions we estimate a model of residential location choice for 
households in Mumbai.  The choice of residential location is modeled as a discrete choice 
problem in which each household’s choice set consists of the chosen house plus a random 
sample of 99 houses from the subset of the 5,000 houses in our sample that the household 
can afford.  Houses are described by a vector of housing characteristics and by the 
characteristics of the neighborhood within a 1 km radius of the house.  Two important 
neighborhood characteristics are ethnic composition (the percent of one’s neighbors of 
the same religion and same mother tongue) and employment accessibility.  In one 
specification we treat the employment location of the primary household earner as fixed 
and characterize houses by their distance from the current work location.  In an alternate 
specification we replace distance to the current workplace by an employment 
accessibility index, to capture opportunities for changing jobs.   
We use the model of residential location to examine the welfare effects of specific 
programs—in situ improvements in housing attributes and the provision of basic public 
services, and a slum relocation program.  Historically, both types of programs have been 
implemented in Mumbai (Mukhija 2001; Mukhija 2002).  In 1985 the World Bank 
launched the Bombay Urban Development Project to provide tenure security and 
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encourage in situ upgrading by slum dwellers.  In the same year the Prime Minister’s 
Grant Project (PMGP), introduced by the state of Maharashtra, proposed to construct new 
housing units on the sites of existing slums in Dharavi.  Currently the Valmiki Ambedkar 
Awas Tojana Program (VAMBAY) provides loans to the poor to build or upgrade 
houses.1
The economics literature on the benefits of slum improvements has, for the most 
part, consisted of hedonic studies that estimate the market value of various improvements, 
including tenure security and infrastructure services (Crane et al. 1997; Jimenez 1983, 
1984).  Kaufman and Quigley (1987) advanced this literature by estimating the 
parameters of household utility functions rather than limiting the analysis to the hedonic 
price function.  We extend this literature in three ways:  first, we introduce employment 
access as a factor influencing the choice of residential location; secondly, we incorporate 
endogenous neighborhood amenities—in particular, the language and religion of one’s 
neighbors—in residential location choice; thirdly, we account for unobserved 
heterogeneity in housing and neighborhood attributes, in the spirit of Bayer et al. (2004b). 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data used in our 
empirical work and presents the stylized facts about where people live and work in 
Mumbai.  Section 3 describes the model of residential location choice.  Section 4 presents 
estimation results and section 5 the welfare effects of slum upgrading policies.  Section 6 
concludes. 
                                                 
1 http://mhada.bom.nic.in/html/web_VAMBAY.htm 
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 II. Job and Housing Locations in Mumbai 
 
The target population of our study is households in the Greater Mumbai Region 
(GMR), which constitutes the core of the Mumbai metropolitan area.  The GMR, with a 
population of 11.9 million people in 2001, is one of the most densely populated cities in 
the world.  Located on the Arabian Sea, the GMR extends 42 km north to south and has a 
maximum width of 17 km.  The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai has divided 
the city into 6 zones (see Figure 1), each with distinctive characteristics.  The southern tip 
of the city (zone 1) is the traditional city center.  Zone 3 is a newly developed commercial 
and employment center, and zones 4, 5 and 6, each served by a different railway line, 
constitute the suburban area.  In the remainder of this section we describe the distribution 
of population and jobs in the GMR, as well as the characteristics of the housing stock, 
based on a random sample of 5,000 households in Mumbai who were surveyed in the 
winter of 2003-2004 (Baker et al. 2005).   
Table 1 presents our sample households, broken down by income category.  
Households earning 5,000 Rs. per month or less constitute the bottom quartile (26.5%) of 
our sample, households earning 5,000-7,500 Rs. per month the next quartile (27.7%), 
households earning 7,500-10,000 Rs. per month 22% of our sample, and households in 
the next two income categories 18% and 6% of our sample, respectively.2   
Almost 40% of our sample households live in slums, with the percent living in 
slums increasing as income falls.  This number is consistent with the extent of slums in 
other cities (United Nations Global Report on Human Settlements 2003). According to 
the United Nations, 924 million people, or 31.6% of the world’s urban population, lived 
                                                 
2 In PPP terms, 5,000 Rs. corresponds to $562 USD.  
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in slums in 2001.  Slums in Mumbai were formed by residents squatting on open land as 
the city developed.3  Slum residents do not possess a transferable title to their property; 
however, “notified” squatter settlements have been registered by the city, and slum 
dwellers in these settlements are unlikely to be evicted.4  Chawls, which house 
approximately 35% of sample households, are usually low-rise apartments with 
community toilets that, on average, have better amenities than slums.  The remaining 
25% of households live either in cooperative housing, which includes modern, high-rise 
apartments, in bungalows, or in employer-provided housing. 
A.  Distribution of Population and Housing 
The spatial distribution of sample households by housing type is shown in Figures 
2 and 3, where each dot represents 5 households, and is summarized in Table 2.  Slums 
are not evenly spread throughout the city: they constitute a higher-than-average fraction 
of the housing stock in zones 5 and 6 (79% and 47%, respectively), but less than 20% of 
the housing stock in zones 1 and 4.   Nonetheless, slum dwellers in Mumbai are 
considerably more integrated among non-slum dwellers than in other cities: 40% of slum-
dwellers live in central Mumbai (zones 1-3).5  In contrast, there are virtually no slums in 
central locations in Delhi or many cities in Latin America (United Nations Global Report 
on Human Settlements 2003).  In these cities, slums are typically located at the periphery:  
as a consequence, slum dwellers may spend several hours commuting to work. 
                                                 
3 For example, Dharavi, the world’s largest slum, was originally a fishing village located on swamp land.  
Slums began forming there in the late 19th century when land was reclaimed for tanneries.  Once on the 
periphery of Mumbai, Dharavi is now centrally located (in zone 2).  
41.8 % of our sample households live in “non-notified” slums and 1.6 % in resettlement areas.  The average 
tenure of households in notified squatter settlements suggests that squatters are unlikely to be evicted:  81% 
of households have been living in current location for more than 10 years while corresponding figure for 
the formal housing sector is 74%. 
5 This is also true of the poor v. the non-poor.  See Baker et al. (2005) Figure 2 and Tables 2 and 3. 
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Table 3 shows characteristics of the housing stock by housing type and zone.  It 
attests to the fact that slum dwellings are, on average, smaller than either chawls or 
cooperative housing, and less likely to have piped water connections or a kitchen inside 
the dwelling.  It is, however, clear that the quality of slum housing varies considerably by 
zone: whereas 61% of slum households have piped water in zone 2, only 19% of slum 
households have piped water in zone 4. 
B. Distribution of Jobs and Commuting Patterns 
 
Table 4, based on data for 6,371 workers in our sample households, shows where 
people living in each zone work.6   Fifty-seven percent of workers in our sample 
households work in zones 1-3, 31% in the suburbs (zones 4-6), and 6% at home.  The rest 
either do not work in a fixed location or work outside of the GMR.  A striking feature of 
Table 4 is the high percent of workers who live in the same zone in which they work.  
This is highest in zones 1-3, but is substantial even in the suburbs.  Replicating Table 4 
for different income and occupational groups reveals that the diagonal elements in the 
table (the percent of people working and living in the same zone) are higher for workers 
in low-income than in high-income households, and are higher for unskilled and skilled 
laborers than for professionals (Baker et al. 2005, Tables 38 and D-1).   
Figure 4, which shows the distribution of one-way commute distances for workers 
in our sample is consistent with Table 4: the median journey to work is less than 3 
kilometers, although the distribution of commute distances has a long tail.  Table 5, 
which shows mean commute distance by zone and income, suggests that persons with 
longer commutes are more likely to live in the suburbs, especially in zones 4 and 6.  With 
                                                 
6 Table 4 is based on the usual commutes of the two most important earners in each household.  Forty 
percent of sample households have more than one earner. 
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few exceptions, mean commute to work increases with income, regardless of zone of 
residence.   
The information presented here suggests that, on average, people in Mumbai live 
close to where they work:  This is especially true for the poor, and also for laborers.  This 
suggests that households may place a high premium on short commutes.  If, in the short 
run, workers’ job locations are fixed, slum upgrading programs that require households to 
move may reduce welfare if they move workers farther from their jobs.  The impact of 
such programs on welfare will, however, also depend on the value attached to housing 
and neighborhood amenities. 
 
III. Analytical Framework 
 
The models of residential location choice we have estimated are descendants of 
discrete location choice models (e.g., McFadden 1978), but incorporate the recent 
literature on the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity in discrete location choice models 
(Bayer et al. 2004b).  This section describes in detail the structure of these models and 
how they will be used to evaluate slum improvement programs.   
A.  Modeling Location Choice 
 
We assume that the utility that household  i  receives from house  h  depends on a 
vector  Xh   of house characteristics, a vector hZ  of aggregate household characteristics of 
the neighborhood the house belongs to (e.g., ethnic composition) and on an index of 
employment accessibility for the principal earner in the household, Eih.  Utility also 
depends on expenditure on all other goods, i.e., on income  yi  minus the user cost of 
housing, ph.  Formally,  
hihhiphiEhZhXhi pyEZXU εξββββ ++−+++= )ln(    (1) 
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where  
 
βrj = α0j+αrjZi ,     r=X, Z,E, p.       (2) 
 
In (1)  ξh  is a house specific constant that captures unobserved house and neighborhood 
characteristics that are perceived identically by all households;  εih  captures unobserved 
housing characteristics as perceived by household  i.  Equation (2) allows each element  j  
of the  β  coefficient vectors to depend on the inner product of a vector of household 
characteristics,  Zi, and a vector of coefficients  αrj. 
Estimation of the parameters of (1) and (2) will allow us to infer the rate of 
substitution between accessibility to work and housing cost, and accessibility to work and 
neighborhood and housing characteristics.  To evaluate the welfare effect of moving 
household  i  from its chosen location to a new one, we compute the amount, CV, that 
must be added to the Hicksian bundle to keep the systematic part of the household’s 
utility constant when it is moved.7
C. Estimation of the Model 
 
In estimating the model of residential location choice each household’s choice set 
consists of the chosen house plus a random sample of 99 houses from the subset of the 
4,023 houses in our sample that the household can afford.8  Because the housing 
attributes in our dataset are highly correlated, we use principal components of the 
attributes in estimating the parameters of equation (1).   
Estimation of the parameters of (1) follows the two-step approach outlined in 
Bayer et al. (2004b).  Let  δh  represent the portion of (1) that varies only by house, i.e., 
                                                 
7 CV is negative for a net improvement in housing and neighborhood characteristics.   
8 The original set of approximately 5,000 households is reduced because information about housing 
characteristics is missing for some houses, and because we eliminate employed-provided housing from the 
choice set. 
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α0X Xh + ξh,  and  θ  the vector of parameters on variables in (1) that vary by both 
household and house (ln(yi-ph),  and the interaction of housing and neighborhood 
attributes with household characteristics).
hiE
9  We find the vector  θ  that maximizes the 
likelihood function for a given value of  {δh}  and calculate the estimated demand for 
each house  h  as  
∑=
i
ihh PD . 
In the second step, we search for the set of  {δh}  that satisfy the maximization condition 
in equation (3), given our first-stage estimate of  θ,  
01)1(/ln =−=+−=∂∂ ∑∑
≠ i
ih
hi
ihhhh PPPL δ , h∀ .     (3) 
Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) show that for any  θ  the unique 
{δh}  that satisfy above conditions can be obtained by solving the contraction mapping 
)ln(1 ∑−=+
i
ih
t
h
t
h Pδδ         (4) 
The  {δh}  obtained in the second stage are used to re-estimate  θ  in step one.  The 
procedure is iterated until our estimators converge.  δh  is then regressed on  Xh  to 
determine the coefficient vector  α0X. 
IV.       Estimation Results 
A. Specification of the Utility Function 
We assume that a household’s utility from its residential location [eq. (1)] 
depends on housing and neighborhood characteristics.  The first ten variables in Table 6 
describe the house itself: whether the dwelling is a slum or a cooperative (chawl is the 
                                                 
9 The neighborhood characteristics used in our empirical work include religion and native language.  We 
assume that α0Z  = 0. 
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omitted category), whether it is a multi-story dwelling (flat), dummy variables to indicate 
the quality of the floor and roof, and the interior space in square feet.  This is followed by 
a series of dummy variables indicating whether the house has a kitchen, a toilet, or a 
bathroom (i.e., a room for washing), and whether there is a piped water connection in the 
house.  Due to the high correlation among these housing characteristics we replace them 
in empirical work by their first two principal components, which have eigenvalues 
greater than one.10  We characterize the location of the house in terms of its distance from 
the nearest railroad track (whether it is < 300m from a track) and by the zone in which it 
is located.11   
Neighborhood characteristics hZ  include religion and mother tongue.  
Specifically, we assume that utility is a function of the percent of households in the 
neighborhood that (a) are of the same religion as the household in question and (b) who 
speak the same mother tongue.12  These variables should capture network externalities 
and other forms of social capital provided by neighbors of the same ethnic background.  
Table 6 indicates the degree of ethnic sorting in Mumbai:  For example, while Muslim 
households comprise only 17% of the city’s population, the average Muslin household in 
our sample lives in a neighborhood that is 35% Muslim.  Although people from the state 
of Gujarat constitute only 12% of the population of Mumbai, the average household from 
Gujarat in our sample lives in a neighborhood that is 26% Gujarati.  The extent of ethnic 
sorting is greater, in relative terms, for minority groups—e.g., for Sikhs, Christians, 
                                                 
10 The first two principal components explain approximately 60% of the variance in housing attributes.  
11 The results in Tables 7 and 9 change little if zone dummies are replaced by section dummies.  (There are 
88 sections in Mumbai.)  We report results using zone dummies for ease of interpretation. 
12  Neighborhood characteristics are computed using sample households within 1 km of each house. A 
neighborhood contains, on average, 67 sample households, although the number varies depending on the 
population density of the area. 
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Buddhists, Tamils and Telugus—than for households in the majority (i.e., Hindus or 
households that speak Marathi or Hindi).  For this reason we allow the coefficient on 
ethnic composition to vary with the percent of one’s neighbors from the same 
background.   
Employment access (Eih) for the principal wage earner in the household is 
computed as follows.  In Model 1, access is measured by the distance from house  h  to 
the worker’s current job location.13  The weight attached to distance from the current job 
location should capture the disutility of relocating in the short run, before the worker can 
change jobs.  In Model 2, we replace distance to the current job from house  h  by the 
average distance from house  h  to  the 100 nearest jobs in the worker’s occupation, based 
on our survey data.  We distinguish five occupations in computing the employment 
accessibility index: unskilled workers, skilled workers, sales and clerical workers, small 
business owners, and managers/professionals.  This variable should capture the disutility 
of being moved away from desirable employment locations, even if the worker can 
change jobs.  
Utility also depends on the log of monthly household income minus the cost of 
housing (i.e., the log of the Hicksian bundle).  The Hicksian bundle is calculated as 
follows.  All sample households were asked what “a dwelling like theirs” would rent for 
and what it would sell for.14  We use the stated monthly market rent as the cost of the 
                                                 
13 The distance from house h to a worker’s job is estimated as the distance between house h (whose location 
is geo-reference in the survey) and the approximate work location.  The work location is approximated by 
the centroid of the intersection of the section and pin code in which the job is located.  
14 We have used the answers to these questions to compute for each household the interest rate that would 
equate the purchase price of the house to the discounted present value of rental payments.  The mean 
interest rate is 5.6% and the median 4.8%. Additional evidence that stated market rents are reliable is 
provided by using them to estimate an hedonic price function for housing in Mumbai.  The housing and 
neighborhood characteristics in Table 6, together with distance to the CBD, explain 64% of the variation in 
monthly rents in our sample.  (See Table A1.) 
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dwelling.  In calculating the income of households who currently own their home, we add 
to household income from earnings and other sources the monthly rent associated with 
the dwelling they own.  For renters, household income is stated income from earnings 
and other sources.15   The mean value of the Hicksian bundle, evaluated at the current 
residence, is 8,275 Rs.  The median Hicksian bundle approximately 6,250 Rs. per month.  
B. Results 
Table 7 presents the results of estimating our models.  The first column of the 
table presents estimates of the parameter vectors  θ  and  α0X.  The parameter vector  θ, 
which contains the coefficients of all variables that vary by household (i.e., the Hicksian 
bundle through measures of language and religion) is estimated in the first stage of the 
estimation procedure together with the set of house-specific constants  {δh}.  In the 
second stage, the  {δh}  are regressed on the principal components of housing 
characteristics, as well as the zone dummies and whether the house is within 300 m of a 
railroad track.  The second column of the table presents the coefficients of the individual 
housing attributes, as well as the marginal value of each amenity, i.e., the marginal rate of 
substitution between the amenity and the Hicksian bundle, evaluated at the median 
household income for our sample (6,250 Rs. per month). 
In both specifications all housing attributes are statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  Other things equal, being in a chawl (the omitted housing category), is worth about 
400 Rs. per month more than being in a slum, whereas being in a coop is worth about 700 
Rs. more than being in a chawl.  Being in a high-rise building (flat) is worth about 730 Rs. 
per month.  The mean value of a piped water connection is about 240 Rs. per month, and 
                                                 
15 Seventy-four percent of sample households claim to own their own home, whereas 26% indicate that 
they rent.  Surprisingly, 83% of households living in notified squatter settlements claim to own their own 
homes, although it is unlikely that they possess a transferable title. 
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mean willingness to pay for a private toilet about 580 Rs. per month.  Overall, the value 
attached to housing attributes seems reasonable, with the exception of “good floor.”   
Workers in Mumbai place a premium on living close to where they work.  Model 
1 suggests that a household with income of 6,250 Rs. per month would give up about 330 
Rs. to decrease the main earner’s one-way commute by 1 km.16  In Model 2, the value of 
a one km decrease in the average distance to the 100 nearest jobs in one’s occupation is 
283 Rs. 
Neighborhood attributes matter.  The value of being with households who speak 
the same mother tongue and have the same religion depends on whether one is in the 
minority or the majority.  In a neighborhood where only 5-10% of one’s neighbors speak 
the same mother tongue, the value of a one percentage point increase in mother tongue is 
large (162 Rs.).  [All values refer to model 1.]  In a neighborhood where 50-75% of one’s 
neighbors speak the same mother tongue, the value of a one percentage point increase is 
only 15 Rs.  Similar results hold for living with members of the same religion: a one 
percentage point increase in the percent of households of the same religion is worth 178 
Rs. evaluated at a baseline of 5-10% but is worth only 13 Rs. in a neighborhood where 
50-75% of households are already of the same religion. 
These values are large, and may reflect various forms of network externalities.  
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2004) emphasize the importance of networks, formed along 
caste lines, in determining the jobs available to workers in Mumbai.  These networks are 
especially important for laborers and unskilled workers.  Similarly, in the United States, 
Bayer, Ross and Topa (2004) find significant evidence of informal hiring networks, based 
                                                 
16 When the distance of the second main earner’s commute is included in the model, the value of a one km 
decrease in the second earner’s commute is about 300 Rs. per month. 
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on the fact that individuals residing in the same block group are more likely to work 
together than those in nearby but not identical blocks.   
In addition to providing employment networks, neighborhoods also serve as 
social capital to mitigate the effects of poverty.  For example, social networks make 
possible the creation of spontaneous mechanisms of informal insurance and can improve 
the efficiency of public service delivery and/or of public social protection systems 
(Collier 1998). 
We should, however, be cautious in interpreting these effects. In reality it is 
virtually impossible to disentangle the different reasons why similar individuals live in 
the same neighborhood.17  Part of this sorting is indeed due to preferences.  However, 
neighborhood composition could also be a result of imperfections in housing markets that 
segregate individuals to specific neighborhoods. 
Other amenities that affect residential location are proximity to a railroad track as 
well as the zone dummies.  Living next to a railroad track can be dangerous, in addition 
to providing visual disamenities:  Approximately 6 people are killed each day crossing 
railroad tracks in Mumbai.  The impact of zone dummies varies with the measure of 
employment access.   
 
V.     Evaluating Slum Improvement Programs 
The set of policies that have been employed to improve the welfare of slum 
dwellers is diverse (Field and Kremer 2005, Mukhija 2001).  Some projects have focused 
on providing secure tenure, on the grounds that this will provide an incentive for slum 
                                                 
17 Ethnic sorting does not appear to reflect the fact that people of the same religion or mother tongue have 
common educations and incomes.  When we attempt to use income and education to explain variation in 
the exposure of households in minority groups to members of their group, F statistics are rarely significant. 
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dwellers to invest in housing (Jimenez 1983, 1984; Malpezzi and Mayo 1987).  Other 
projects, such as those implemented under the World Bank’s Sites-and-Services program 
(Kaufmann and Quigley 1987; Buckley and Kalarickel 2004) have combined secure 
tenure with provision of basic infrastructure services (piped water and electricity) and 
loans to allow slum dwellers to themselves build/upgrade their housing.18  More recently, 
greater emphasis has been placed on providing incentives for community management 
and maintenance, including constructing or rehabilitating community centers, and on 
improving access to health care and education.   
In this paper we focus on improving the physical aspect of slums by providing 
infrastructure services and improving housing quality.  In Mumbai, virtually all slum 
dwellers have access to electricity; however, only half have piped water.  Slum housing 
consists of small, dilapidated shacks with poor roofs.  Programs to improve the physical 
quality of housing could involve in situ improvements or could involve housing 
reconstruction, either at the site of the original slum or in a location where bare land is 
available.   
We evaluate stylized versions of both types of programs—in situ upgrading and 
relocation of slum households to better housing.  We focus on slum households located in 
zone 5, specifically households in sections 79 and 80 who are located within one mile of 
the Harbor Railway.  The characteristics of our sample households living in these slums 
appear in Table 8.  These households are, on average, much poorer than our sample as 
whole, although 85% claim to own their own home.  Average house size is small—141 
                                                 
18 In the World Bank sites-and-services project in El Salvador evaluated by Kaufman and Quigley (1987), 
slum dwellers were given financing to purchase lots on which infrastructure services were provided, as well 
as materials to construct new homes.  Imperfections in credit markets and in the provision of infrastructure 
services are major reasons for initiating slum improvement projects.   
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sq. ft. in section 79 and 162 sq. ft. in section 80.  Almost no houses have good roofs and 
only one quarter have piped water connections.  The primary earner in households in both 
sections commutes, on average, 5 km to work (one-way), although the variance in 
commute distance is large.  In terms of language and religion, the majority of households 
in section 79 are Marathi-speaking Hindus.  In section 80, the majority of households 
speak Hindi; sixty percent are Hindus and one-third are Muslims. 
The in situ program provides good roofs and piped water connections for 
households that do not have them.  The relocation program moves households from their 
current locations to new housing in Mankurd, a neighborhood in zone 5 where some 
households displaced by transportation improvement programs have been relocated.19  
(The original locations of households and the relocation site are shown in Figure 5.)  We 
assume that households are moved into good quality, low-rise buildings with piped water 
but with community toilets.  We assume in the short run that workers in resettled 
households continue to work in their old job locations.  The religious makeup of the new 
neighborhood is approximately half Hindu and half Muslim.  Sixty percent of households 
speak Hindi and one-third speak Marathi.   
To compute the welfare effects of each program, we calculate for each household 
the amount of money the household must be given, in exchange for the vector of program 
attributes, to keep the systematic portion of the household’s utility constant.  
Compensating variation (CV) is implicitly defined as: 
                                                 
19 The second Mumbai Urban Transportation Program (MUTPII) will involve resettling 20,000 households 
located on railway rights-of-way. 
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)ln( 00
00 pyEZX ipiEZX −+++ ββββ = )ln( 0111 CVpyEZX ipiEZX +−+++ ββββ 20
where  0’s  denote housing and neighborhood attributes originally consumed and  1’s  
denote attributes consumed with the program.  Welfare effects from the relocation 
program are computed assuming that households pay the same amount for their housing 
with and without the program.  CV should therefore be interpreted as the monetary value 
of the benefits of the program over and above current housing costs.  Welfare effects 
from the relocation program are computed holding current job location fixed, to capture 
the short-run effects of the program and replacing current job location by the employment 
access index, to capture opportunities for workers to change jobs.   
Table 9 reports the mean welfare effects of the in situ upgrading program and the 
relocation program under alternate assumptions about workplace location.  The 25th, 50th 
and 75th percentile of CV values for the households in Table 8 are also presented in the 
table.  The in situ upgrading program is worth, on average, approximately 500 Rs. per 
month, or about 10% of household income.  The range of CV values for the programs 
reflects the range of incomes of the affected households.  The mean benefit of the 
relocation program differs substantially between households who originally lived in 
section 79 and those who lived in section 80 and depends crucially on employment and 
neighborhood effects:  Households originally residing in section 80 are, on average, 
better off under the relocation program than under in situ upgrading; the reverse holds for 
households from section 79.   
                                                 
20 This definition implies that CV is negative for a welfare improvement. 
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To better understand the impacts of relocating, Table 9 presents the mean effects 
of different components of the slum upgrading program.  For example, the mean benefit 
of the housing improvement associated with the program is 813 Rs. per month for 
households from section 79 (Distance to work model).  Holding workplace location fixed, 
the mean disbenefit of being moved farther from the workplace is 290 Rs. per month, and 
the mean disbenefit of changing neighborhood composition 490 Rs. per month.21  
Although the relocation program yields approximately equal housing benefits to both 
groups, and moves households away from railroad tracks, workers from section 79 are 
being moved much farther from their jobs than workers who originally lived in section 80.  
(The latter, on average, actually benefit by being moved closer to their jobs.)  The other 
major difference in welfare between the two groups comes from neighborhood effects.  
Households who originally lived in section 79, who are primarily Marathi-speaking 
Hindus, are being moved into a neighborhood with a greater proportion of Muslim and 
Hindi-speaking households.  They lose, on average, from the change in neighborhood 
composition.  For households from section 79, the disbenefits of changes in commute 
distance and neighborhood composition actually wipe out the housing benefits of the 
slum improvement program, a result consistent with Kapoor et al. (2004). 
The impact of the relocation program however depends on the assumptions made 
about workplace location.  When workplace location is held fixed, the households from 
section 79, who are on average being moved farther away from their jobs, are worse off 
than if they are able to change jobs:  average welfare losses due to a longer commute go 
down when distance to work is replaced by the employment accessibility index (job 
                                                 
21 The sum of the mean compensating variations for each component of the program will not add to the 
mean CV for the program as a whole because the Hicksian bundle enters the utility function non-linearly. 
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access model).  In the particular example illustrated in Table 9, however, the welfare 
impact of allowing workers to change jobs is not large in quantitative terms.  This is 
because the site of improved housing is not far away from section 79. 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate more clearly the impact of changes in neighborhood 
composition and employment access on the benefits of slum improvement programs.  
The figures plot the median CV associated with our sample improvement program, for all 
beneficiaries in Table 8, as the location of the improved housing is moved to different 
places in the city.  In Figure 7 we assume that the primary worker in the household 
maintains his current place of employment when the household relocates; in Figure 6 we 
measure employment opportunities by the primary worker’s employment index.  In both 
figures, blue areas indicate locations that are welfare-reducing; orange and yellow areas 
indicate moves that are, on average welfare-enhancing.  (In both figures, neighborhood 
composition changes ipso facto with location.)   
When each worker’s job location is held fixed (Figure 7), the set of locations for 
the program that yield positive benefits (negative mean CV) is small indeed.  The set of 
locations yielding positive benefits is much larger in Figure 6, in which household utility 
depends on the employment access index.  If potential participants in slum relocation 
programs look only at these programs from a short-run perspective (assuming that they 
cannot or will not change jobs), participation is likely to be much lower than if a longer-
run perspective is taken.   
VI.  Conclusions 
In the early Twentieth Century, slum improvement programs in many countries 
were equivalent to slum clearance—hardly a solution to the problem of lack of adequate 
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housing in developing country cities.  Beginning in the 1970’s the strategy shifted to one 
of improving and consolidating existing housing—often by providing slum dwellers 
tenure security, combined with the materials needed to upgrade their housing or—in 
areas where land was plentiful—to build new housing.  Emphasis on in situ 
improvements has continued to the present.  These improvements may take the form of 
providing infrastructure services and other forms of physical capital, but also include 
efforts to foster community management, and access to health care and education.  At the 
same time, some have called for replacing slums with multiple story housing either at the 
site of the original slum or in an alternate location. 
In order to design successful slum improvement programs it is important to 
determine whether program benefits exceed program costs.  It is also important, from the 
perspective of cost recovery, to determine household willingness to pay for specific 
program options.  The early literature (Mayo and Gross 1987) focused on estimating the 
percent of income households were willing to spend on housing.  This was followed by a 
literature that attempted to measure, using hedonic price functions, the market value of 
various improvements, including tenure security and infrastructure services (Crane et al. 
1997; Jimenez 1984).  It is, however, difficult using the hedonic approach to value 
attributes that vary by household, such as distance to work, or the percent of neighbors 
similar to oneself.  We believe that both sets of attributes are important in valuing slum 
improvement programs and have attempted to extend the literature by illustrating the 
value placed on these amenities by households in Mumbai.   
We believe that the model estimated in this paper can be of use in calculating the 
relative welfare gains from alternative slum improvement programs.  It is also useful in 
 20
predicting which households would be likely to participate in various programs, given 
costs of participation.  In assessing the limited success of sites-and-services programs, 
Mayo and Gross (1987) cite the failure of many programs to choose the right package of 
services to promote cost-recovery.  Location is an important component of the design of a 
slum improvement program.  One contribution of this paper is to quantify, for the case of 
Mumbai, the quantitative importance of location versus other program characteristics.
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Table 1.  Selected Household Characteristics in Mumbai, by Income Group 
 Income Group (in rupees per month) 
Characteristic < 5 k 5–7.5k 7.5–10k 10–20 k >20 k All HHs
Household size (mean) 4 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.4 
Age of Head (mean) 38.2 39.4 41.1 42.9 45 40.4 
Female Head (%) 8.8 3 3.9 3.2 1.3 4.5 
Education (%)       
  Primary or less 20.6  10.8  7.2  2.0  0.3  10.4  
  College or above 4.0  7.9  17.0  39.2  66.5  18.0  
Occupation (%)       
 Unskilled 33.9  21.0  11.1  3.5  1.3  17.9  
Housing Category (%)       
  Squatter settlement 52.2 45.3 34.3 16.1 6.2 37.2 
  Chawls 37.5 37.5 41.5 27.6 9.9 34.9 
  Cooperative Housing 5.2 9.6 17.1 47.6 78 21 
  Other 5.1 7.7 7.2 8.8 5.9 7.1 
Housing Tenure (%)       
  Less than 5 years 18.6 14.5 13.2 20.1 17.4 16.4 
  6-9 years 8.2 7.5 7.1 8.5 10.8 8 
  More than 10 years 34.5 35.3 34.7 31.3 46.6 35 
  Since birth 38.7 42.7 45 40.1 25.3 40.6 
Within-household access to:       
   Piped Water 48 64 75 92 99 69 
   Toilet 12 18 31 64 89 32 
   Kitchen 29 43 61 87 98 54 
 
 
Table 2.  Percent of Households in Different Types of Housing by Zone  
Zone       
1 2 3 4 5 6 Average
Slum 19.2 36.8 35.1 16.9 78.9  47.3  38.7 
Chawl/Wadi 52.0 39.9 37.5 50.2 7.3  24.0  35.2 
Coop/Employer-Provided Housing 28.7 23.3 27.4 32.9 13.8  28.7  26.1 
 
Table 3.  Housing Characteristics by Housing Type and Zone 
 
 
Zone Slum Chawl 
Coop/ 
Employer 
Provided 
All Types 
1 24% 59% 87% 60% 
2 26% 46% 87% 48% 
3 40% 41% 97% 56% 
4 55% 37% 89% 57% 
5 41% 63% 100% 50% 
6 34% 46% 94% 54% K
itc
he
n 
in
 th
e 
un
it 
Average 37% 45% 92% 54% 
1 8% 42% 73% 45% 
2 6% 10% 65% 21% 
3 4% 18% 98% 35% 
4 13% 16% 88% 39% 
5 4% 6% 96% 16% 
6 5% 26% 91% 35% To
ile
t i
n 
th
e 
un
it 
Average 5% 21% 86% 32% 
1 38% 75% 96% 74% 
2 50% 80% 98% 73% 
3 61% 53% 98% 68% 
4 43% 47% 91% 61% 
5 28% 60% 98% 40% 
6 24% 54% 94% 51% 
B
at
hr
oo
m
 in
 th
e 
un
it 
Average 39% 60% 95% 61% 
1 36% 94% 99% 84% 
2 61% 93% 100% 83% 
3 74% 58% 98% 75% 
4 19% 48% 93% 58% 
5 41% 69% 100% 51% 
6 47% 67% 100% 67% W
at
er
 in
 th
e 
un
it 
Average 50% 69% 98% 69% 
1 171  259  417  288  
2 147  208  325  212  
3 190  221  453  274  
4 163  223  492  302  
5 170  200  387  202  
6 182  231  426  264  
Si
ze
 (s
qf
t) 
Average 172  226  428  258  
 
 
 
Table 4. Percentage Distribution of Workers Across Job Locations, by Zone of 
Residence 
  Work location               
Home At home Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5 Zone 6 Outside  of GMR  Not fixed
Zone 1 8.5  76.0  5.4  4.1  0.9  1.1  2.9  1.2  0.1  
Zone 2 6.2  20.3  60.4  6.1  1.6  1.5  1.0  2.8  0.0  
Zone 3 5.0  6.7  5.0  73.1  4.2  2.0  0.7  0.3  3.0  
Zone 4 8.8  10.2  4.3  21.2  47.8  0.5  0.8  3.1  3.2  
Zone 5 2.1  9.0  7.8  6.7  0.9  54.6  6.7  4.7  7.7  
Zone 6 4.4  13.3  8.1  7.7  15.1  3.6  37.6  5.4  4.9  
Average 5.8  19.5  15.1  22.3  13.4  9.3  8.5  2.9  3.2  
  
 
Table 5.  Mean Commute Distance by Zone and Income (km) 
Zone <5k 5k-7.5k 7.5k-10k 10k-20k >20k All HHs
1 2.3 2.7 3.5 3.7 4.6 3.3 
2 2.8 3.5 4.4 4.5 5.7 4.0 
3 2.8 3.5 4.7 5.1 5.0 4.1 
4 4.8 6.7 6.3 9.5 11.3 7.1 
5 3.7 4.5 5.8 4.5 6.0 4.6 
6 6.2 7.7 8.8 8.9 10.4 8.0 
Average 3.9 4.9 5.7 6.1 7.7 5.3 
 
Table 6.  Summary Statistics of Variables in Location Choice Model
Mean Sd. Dev Distribution inpopulation
Slum 0.39 -
Coop 0.22 -
Flat 0.20 -
Good floor 0.81 -
Good roof 0.42 -
House size (sqft) 252 174
Kitchen in house 0.53 -
Toilet in house 0.30 -
Bathroom in house 0.61 -
Water in house 0.69 -
<300m to rail track 0.20 -
Zone2 0.17 -
Zone3 0.24 -
Zone4 0.23 -
Zone5 0.13 -
Zone6 0.12 -
Neighbor with same religion*
Hindu 79% 0.15 74%
Muslim 34% 0.19 17%
Christian 8% 0.07 4%
Sikh 4% 0.03 0%
Buddhist 10% 0.06 3%
Jain 4% 0.03 1%
Neighbor with same language
Marathi 55% 0.17 48%
Hindi 33% 0.17 24%
Konkani 4% 0.04 2%
Gujarati 26% 0.14 12%
Marwari 5% 0.05 2%
Punjabi 4% 0.04 1%
Sindhi 4% 0.06 0%
Kannada 2% 0.02 1%
Tamil 4% 0.04 2%
Telugu 5% 0.07 1%
English 7% 0.06 1%
1st earner commute distance (km) 5.5 7.3
Job access index for main eaner 2.39 1.16
Hicksian bundle (Rs. /month) 8275 7217
*First column: For Hindu households in the sample, the average % of Hindus in the
neighborhood
Table 7. Estimation Results for Model of Location Choice
Implied coefficients on original variables:
Distance to
work Job access
Distance to
work Job access
ln(Hicksian bundle) 5.12 5.06 Slum -0.34 -0.33
[54.33]** [54.61]** [53.00]** [54.68]**
Main earner commute*** -0.27 -0.23 Coop 0.58 0.56
[72.30]** [14.43]** [43.99]** [45.46]**
Same religion(<1%) 65.62 81.41 Flat 0.60 0.59
[2.71]** [3.45]** [40.74]** [42.14]**
Same religion(1-5%) 20.07 19.60 Good floor -0.05 -0.06
[3.03]** [3.08]** [2.12]** [2.50]**
Same religion(5-10%) 14.59 15.01 Good roof 0.39 0.38
[3.99]** [4.24]** [53.09]** [54.77]**
Same religion(10-25%) 1.05 1.82 Size 0.28 0.27
[1.16] [2.08]* [53.65]** [54.94]**
Same religion(25-50%) 3.11 3.03 Kitchen 0.20 0.19
[6.79]** [6.91]** [18.83]** [19.04]**
Same religion(50-75%) 1.03 1.13 Toilet 0.48 0.46
[3.31]** [3.74]** [57.78]** [59.57]**
Same religion(>75%) 3.46 2.53 Bathroom 0.21 0.20
[11.10]** [9.02]** [19.73]** [19.97]**
Same language(<1%) 102.62 102.19 Water 0.20 0.19
[6.38]** [6.54]** [22.47]** [22.79]**
Same language(1-5%) 11.07 15.31
[2.29]* [3.29]** WTP (at HH Income of Rs.6250 /month)
Same language(5-10%) 13.25 12.02 Distance Job access
[4.35]** [4.07]** Main earner commute -329 -283
Same language(10-25%) 4.31 5.14 Same religion(<1%) 801 1006
[6.40]** [7.94]** Same religion(1-5%) 245 242
Same language(25-50%) 2.29 2.39 Same religion(5-10%) 178 185
[7.84]** [8.43]** Same religion(10-25%) 13 22
Same language(50-75%) 1.24 1.06 Same religion(25-50%) 38 37
[3.99]** [3.55]** Same religion(50-75%) 13 14
Same language(>75%) -1.08 -0.11 Same religion(>75%) 42 31
[1.31] [0.13] Same language(<1%) 1252 1262
1st PC for house characteristics 0.50 0.49 Same language(1-5%) 135 189
[69.24]** [71.12]** Same language(5-10%) 162 148
2nd PC for house characteristics -0.17 -0.17 Same language(10-25%) 53 63
[11.46]** [12.09]** Same language(25-50%) 28 30
zone==2 0.19 -0.37 Same language(50-75%) 15 13
[3.22]** [6.51]** Same language(>75%) -13 -1
zone==3 1.23 -0.30 Slum -411 -405
[21.99]** [5.68]** Coop 704 696
zone==4 1.90 -0.50 Flat 734 726
[33.82]** [9.48]** Good floor -62 -70
zone==5 0.97 -0.41 Good roof 480 473
[15.15]** [6.85]** Size (at 200sqft) 1.7 1.7
zone==6 1.74 -0.10 Kitchen 243 235
[26.77]** [1.61] Toilet 581 572
Within 0.3km from rail track -0.05 -0.06 Bathroom 252 244
[1.37] [1.70] Water 246 239
Constant -1.09 0.31 * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
[23.06]** [7.02]**
Observations 4023 4023
Pseudo R-squared (1st stage) 0.39 0.24
LL -13787 -16225
Chisq 17724 9970
R-squared (2nd stage) 0.65 0.59
*** In the first column distance to current job and in the second
column, average distance to nearest 100 jobs within main
earner's occupation category
Table 8.  Summary Statistics of Households in Targeted Area
Section 79 Section 80 Relocation In-situImporvement
# in sample 80 42
Hicksian bundle (Rs. /month) 5009 5993 Unchanged Unchanged
Flat 0.00 0.00 NO Unchanged
Good floor 0.75 0.45 YES Unchanged
Good roof 0.05 0.00 YES YES
House size (sqft) 141 162 165 Unchanged
Kitchen 0.21 0.26 NO Unchanged
Toilet 0.00 0.00 NO Unchanged
Bathroom 0.10 0.07 NO Unchanged
Water 0.26 0.24 YES YES
1st earner commute distance (km) 5.0 4.9 5.7 Unchanged
1st earner Job Access index 1.6 2.6 2.0 Unchanged
<300m to rail track 0.58 0.40 NO Unchanged
Neighbor with same religion
Hindu 73% 61% 45% Unchanged
Muslim 15% 31% 45% Unchanged
Christian NA NA 1% Unchanged
Sikh NA NA 0% Unchanged
Buddhist 17% 12% 8% Unchanged
Jain NA NA 0% Unchanged
Neighbor with same language
Marathi 61% 40% 34% Unchanged
Hindi 19% 47% 60% Unchanged
Konkani 1% NA 0% Unchanged
Gujarati 1% NA 0% Unchanged
Marwari 13% NA 0% Unchanged
Punjabi NA NA 0% Unchanged
Sindhi NA NA 0% Unchanged
Kannada 0% 1% 0% Unchanged
Tamil 8% NA 0% Unchanged
Telugu NA NA 1% Unchanged
English NA NA 1% Unchanged
Current situation Upgrading
Table 9. Effects of Slum Upgrading Program
Section 79 80 79 80 79 80
Total Compensating Variation (Rs. /month)
Mean 89 -1194 -216 -1315 -474 -591
Std Dev 1373 1595 1289 1697 326 377
25% -355 -1369 -587 -1581 -672 -672
50% 107 -731 -73 -929 -269 -630
75% 646 -394 463 -371 -269 -269
Mean contribution*
House -813 -911 -800 -889
Commute 290 -87 119 -169
Rail track -29 -24 -34 -29
Neighbor 490 -416 366 -518
* The mean contribution doesn't add up to the mean total CV, since these values are
calculated as maginal valuation of the an attribute times the change in an attribute in
question.
Relocation Case
(Dist to work model)
Relocation Case
(Job access model) In-situ Improvements



Figure 4.  Sample Distribution fo One-way Commute Distance 
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Table A1 Hedonic Rent Function Estimates
Dependent var=ln(rent) 1 2
Slum -0.09 -0.09
[4.34]*** [4.36]***
Coop 0.29 0.28
[7.88]*** [7.78]***
flat 0.34 0.34
[9.28]*** [9.33]***
Good floor 0.06 0.06
[2.55]** [2.63]***
Good wall 0.35 0.36
[8.39]*** [8.44]***
Good roof 0.08 0.08
[3.56]*** [3.33]***
Size 0.40 0.40
[20.10]*** [20.18]***
Kitchen 0.06 0.07
[2.91]*** [3.29]***
Toilet 0.10 0.10
[3.80]*** [3.47]***
Bathroom 0.07 0.07
[3.19]*** [3.16]***
Water 0.05 0.04
[2.56]** [2.11]**
Near rail track -0.02 -0.03
[1.22] [1.45]
zone==2 -0.07 -0.08
[1.60] [1.78]*
zone==3 -0.13 -0.13
[2.02]** [2.07]**
zone==4 -0.22 -0.22
[2.79]*** [2.80]***
zone==5 -0.20 -0.20
[3.26]*** [3.22]***
zone==6 -0.25 -0.25
[3.42]*** [3.41]***
Neighbor's income 0.00004 0.00004
[11.12]*** [10.88]***
Ln(distnace to CBD) -0.09 -0.09
[2.83]*** [2.66]***
Near rail station 0.00
[0.10]
Near bus stop 0.14
[4.86]***
Vehicle accessible road 0.04
[1.80]*
Constant 4.56 4.38
[38.46]*** [35.53]***
Observations 4132 4132
Adjusted R-squared 0.639 0.641
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
